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ABSTRACT 
 While the Department of Defense experiments with initiatives that move toward a 
more seamless and integrated repository of data through cloud computing, it is essential 
to consider the most effective technologies that will provide Commanders with the tools 
necessary to make timely decisions, yet at the same time not cause unnecessary risk and 
sacrifice to national security. This thesis outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the 
Navy adopting variations of Multi-Level Security (MLS) architectures in comparison to 
its current Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) architectures. This thesis also analyzes current 
CDS policies to determine needed improvements that account for emerging CDS 
technology. 
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To my mom: A woman whose depth knows no bounds, whose classiness is 
inspirational, and whose passion for education increases with age! The radiance in your 
eyes, the “sunshine” that envelopes you, and the way you live your life clearly speak 
volumes to everyone. You are the wind beneath my wings, my life coach, closest confidant, 
and greatest encouragement!  
There are so many examples of your impact on my life, but here is one example 
that I remember just like it was yesterday: it was a weekday afternoon and I wrapped my 
small arms around the white staircase spindle with the tightest grip, and the most dead-
weight that my 60-pound frame could muster. I screamed, “No, Mom, I can’t do this! I 
don’t want to go,” at which point, your 5ʹ1ʺ frame pointedly pulled me off the staircase, 
tossed me over your shoulder, carried me into the garage, and placed me into what would 
later be coined the “soccer and Girl Scouts mom” van. It was my first gymnastics lesson 
and I was too nervous and unconfident to even think about trying something new in front 
of people I did not know.  
This physical illustration is a metaphorical word picture of what you did for me in 
every aspect of my life. You know me best—and you played the critical role as my strong 
mentor, committed encourager, and dedicated life coach. You instilled me with a deep 
desire for achievement and learning at a very young age. You taught me how to read by 
the time I was four years old and you homeschooled me until I entered the 2nd grade—all 
while you worked as an RDAEF.  
You embody the definition of a trailblazer—you were the first person in your entire 
family to graduate high school. Then, you earned your bachelor’s degree in psychology 
with a minor in Bible and Christian counseling. You accomplished all of these things in 
spite of the adverse circumstances in which you were raised. I witnessed you study all night 
long for your dental and college courses, and you instilled the deepest passion in me for 
learning and mental toughness. You led by example and never let me quit anything. Thank 
you for demonstrating what a God-fearing woman of faith, mother, and wife look like, and 
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for your steady and faithful prayers that laid the foundation for our entire family. You were 
able to pull me off my proverbial “staircases” in life because you followed the Lord and 
had the tenacity to follow the path less traveled in your own life.  
You are my and Dad’s “General.” You modeled both a strong confidence and 
command presence in every area; both of which are attributes that you strategically taught 
us to exude. We later would need to rely on these attributes to succeed as Officers, and in 
life. Without you, we both would not be who we are, or where we are at today.  Your strong 
leadership qualities and overcoming in your life is what brought us to where we are today. 
You have been, and you are the wind beneath our wings. 
To my dad:  Thank you for your demonstration of a hard work ethic, and for your 
great example of faith and character. My inspiration to join the military began with your 
service in the Army. You began to take college courses when I was in the fourth grade with 
aspirations to earn your commission as an Army Chaplain. As a Sergeant First Class 
Chaplain’s Assistant in the Army, you were my first salute upon commissioning. Following 
my commissioning, you were the first person in your family to earn a master’s degree—
which consisted of courses that you took simultaneous to your full-time job. After that, you 
accomplished your goal to commission as an Army Chaplain, and you promoted to O-3 
one month before I promoted to O-3. I saluted you upon my promotion to O-3, and now 
we both continue the race to O-4. Thank you for demonstrating what a God-fearing father 
looks like, and for your steady love, encouragement, and advice to us!  It is such an 
inspiration to see you walking in God’s calling as an incredible Army Chaplain to Army 
Soldiers who respect and follow you anywhere—in addition to your ability to teach, serve, 
counsel, and encourage Veterans at the Veterans Administration Hospital. 
To my research sponsor, Battlespace Awareness and Information Operations 
Program Office (PMW 120), thesis advisor, Dr. Dan Boger, co-advisor, CDR (Ret) Sue 
Higgins, and second reader, CAPT (Ret) Scot Miller—thank you for your dedication and 




The Department of Defense does not have an innovation problem; it has an 
innovation adoption problem. 
—Eric Schmidt, testimony to Congress, 17 April 2018 
Naval leaders call for agility and innovation to prepare for and win the next war. 
As the world is being transformed by artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and data 
analytics, the military faces new threats and new opportunities. The confluence of these 
technologies promises that military leaders will make decisions with greater speed and 
accuracy, helping to reduce the fog of war.  
As the Department of Defense (DoD) experiments with initiatives that move 
towards a more seamless and integrated repository of data storage via cloud computing 
initiatives, it is essential to consider the most effective technologies that will provide 
Commanders with the tools they need to make timely decisions, yet at the same time not 
cause unnecessary risk and sacrifice national security.  
Emergent technology shapes policies across the DoD. The Federal, DoD, and Navy 
cloud strategies, as well as data and artificial intelligence (AI) strategies are new in the last 
12–18 months (Cyber Security and Information Systems Information Analysis Center, 
2020, p. 1). As the data generated from these emergent technologies is stored on the cloud, 
CDSs (including MLS), will need to be employed to access and/or transfer data between 
security domains with varying classification levels. 
An MLS system would allow the use of a single computer to access varying security 
domains and transfer data between those domains, based on users’ security clearances and 
need to know. Data would be labeled appropriately to preclude breaches of security 
between security domains. Interest in MLS has increased as computing processing, data 
storage, and computer memory has increased, making Big Data available now to the 
operators.  
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This thesis views the adoption of technology, specifically MLS, through three 
lenses. A contextual lens considers how MLS can integrate into a digitally transformed 
Navy. A second lens looks at technical development. Through an organizational lens, the 
thesis explores what institutional change is needed to sustain adoption. The approach 
provides a broad framework for leaders who consider adopting any new technology.  
A. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used was exploratory and qualitative. The researcher reviewed 
literature and policies. Conversations were held with subject matter experts in person and 
electronically. To address the pros and cons of adopting MLS technology the researcher 
explored ways in which MLS technology is used in other Services and where the Navy 
could leverage MLS technology better than it currently does, such as mission sets that 
require size, weight, power, and cooling (SWAPC) considerations. The research 
considered requirements for developing this technology and explored practical steps 
needed to implement MLS technology. The policies applicable to this topic were analyzed. 
Additionally, it considered whether current policies and requirements regarding MLS are 
sufficient to address the Navy’s growing repository of data and the increasing speed of 
technology advancement.  
Prior to reaching out to subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding CDS and MLS, 
working definitions of relevant terms were outlined using the Committee on National 
Security Systems’ (CNSS) definitions. Once those definitions were established, 
exploratory qualitative analysis was used to conduct research on MLS and current CDS 
policies, as well as to visit and talk to subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Defense 
Information Assurance (IA)/Security Accreditation Working Group (DSAWG), National 
Security Agency (NSA), NAVWARSYSCOM, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), 




B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary: 
1. Should the Navy adopt more Multi-Level Security (MLS) environments in 
comparison to other Cross Domain Solution (CDS) architectures that are 
more widely implemented today in the Navy? 
Subsidiary: 
2. Is an MLS environment a higher risk than the current CDSs in operation? 
3. Are the current CDS and MLS policies sufficient or problematic? 
4. Are there MLS solutions that other branches of the military have 
successfully implemented? 
5. If so, are there particular Navy mission sets that would be similarly suited 
for an MLS environment? 
6. Are current policies or a cultural mindset keeping the Navy from adopting 
an MLS environment? 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
• Chapter I: Introduction.  
• Chapter II: Literature Review and Background. This section provides a 
background of Multi-Level security development and implementation. 
• Chapter III: MLS Technology, Assessment and Authorization. This 
section discusses the three different types of cross domain solutions, with 
a specific focus on MLS. It also provides an overview of the CDS 
approval process.  
• Chapter IV: Digital Transformation. This section discusses Navy and DoD 
emergent technology strategies that support the National Defense Strategy, 
and how MLS is leveraged to support these technologies.  
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• Chapter V: Organizational Issues Related to the Adoption of New 
Technology. This section applies an adaptation of the Galbraith Star 
Model™ to determine how well CDS technology (such as MLS) are 
integrated and aligned with cultural practices within the DoD.  
• Chapter VI: Conclusions, Recommendations, Future Work 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
This chapter reviews background and related research. It introduces Multi-Level 
security (MLS) concepts and definitions.  
A. BELL-LAPADULA MODEL 
Foundational work on MLS was done in the 1970s for the U.S. Air Force by MIT 
Research Establishment (MITRE) researchers David E. Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula. 
They proposed a mathematical model of computer systems security known as the Bell-
LaPadula (BLP) model of Multi-Level security (Bell & LaPadula, 1973, p. iii). The second 
volume of that paper was written two decades later, and it more specifically discusses two 
properties known as the simple-security property and the *-property (pronounced star 
property) (Bell & LaPadula, MITRE Technical Report 2547, 1996, p. 2). The simple-
security policy (e.g., “no read up”) ensures that a process at a lower classification is unable 
to access information at a higher classification (e.g., a user with a Secret clearance cannot 
access data classified as Top Secret). A process can include instances of a programs that 
runs on a computer, such as Microsoft Word. The BLP’s *-property (e.g., “no write down”) 
ensures that no user can write data to a lower classification level than it has access to (e.g., 
programs running at “Secret” cannot write files at “unclassified”).  
The BLP model implements combinations of discretionary access control (DAC) 
and mandatory access control (MAC) to achieve specific access controls described in the 
previous paragraph (Bell, Looking Back at the Bell-La Padula Model, 2005, p. 10). Access 
control models, such as DAC and MAC, are “generally concerned with whether subjects 
[e.g., any entity that can manipulate information, such as a user, user process, system 
process], can access objects [e.g., entities through which information flows through the 
actions of a subject, such as a directory, file, screen, keyboard, memory, storage, printer], 
and how this access can occur” (Ausanka-Crues, 2006, p. 2).  
DAC policies allow subjects to decide who can achieve access to their objects. 
DAC policies are implemented by almost every operating system (OS) such as a standard 
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UNIX OS, Linux, and Windows OS (Conrad, Misenar, & Feldman, CISSP Study Guide, 
2016, p. 321).  
MAC does not allow users to determine who has access to specific data files and 
resources. Instead, MAC uses the OS to determine access control based on a user’s 
clearance and data labels (e.g.unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) (Conrad, 
Misenar, & Feldman, CISSP Study Guide, 2016, p. 321). MAC is widely used across 
Security-enhanced Linux (SELinux) and Windows OS, among other OSs (Ismail, Senousy, 
& Aboelseoud, 2014, pp. 10-11). Additionally, “MAC is the main access control model 
used by military and intelligence agencies to maintain classification policy access 
restrictions…[because] the risk of attack is very high, confidentiality is a primary access 
control [concern, and] the objects being protected are valuable” (Ausanka-Crues, 2006, p. 
2). MLS is a well-known MAC implementation, and the BLP model introduced the basic 
model of MLS (Rjaibi & Bird, 2004, p. 1010).  
B. OTHER MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY RESEARCH  
1. 1970s MLS Research 
Specific security mechanisms must be implemented to enforce MAC, such as those 
associated with Dorothy Denning’s 1976 “A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow.” 
This research describes a MAC model to establish a mathematical basis for enforcing 
information security policies on a computer system (Denning, 1976, p. 242).  
In 1977, the Ford Aerospace and Communications Corporation (FACC) began 
work for the DoD’s Kernelized Secure Operating System (KSOS), which was funded by 
various DoD agencies (Ford Aerospace and Communications Development, 1981, p. 1). 
The purpose of the KSOS was to instantiate an MLS formula generator that produced 
prototype support tools that could be used in code proofs (Ford Aerospace and 
Communications Development, 1981, p. 42). 
2. 1980s-1990s MLS Research 
In 1983, Honeywell’s MLS Secure Communications Processor (SCOMP) was 
sponsored by the Navy to handle messaging at differing classification levels (National 
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Bureau of Standards, 1982, pp. 14, 58). Its final report stated future research and 
development (R&D) investments should be from both the government and industry 
(National Bureau of Standards, 1982, p. 45). 
In the mid-1980s, the DoD used BLACKER as the name for a long-term project 
that built an integrated device suite to secure the Defense Data Network (DDN) 
(Weissman, 1992, p. 286). According to the same article, “BLACKER employs the Bell-
LaPadula Security Model…in which a DDN host computer is a subject and a cryptographic 
communication connection between two hosts is an object” (Weissman, 1992, p. 287).  
The Sea View project’s goal was to create an MLS database for the DoD that met 
the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Lunt, Denning, Schell, Heckman, 
& Schockley, 1990, p. 593). Research from 1989 (by Lunt et al., 1990) created a formal 
security policy model to incorporate a secure Multi-Level relational database into the Sea 
View project (Lunt, Denning, Schell, Heckman, & Schockley, 1990, p. 583). 
3. 2000s MLS Research 
The National Science Foundation and Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) sponsored research to analyze three kernel-based MLS Architectures. 
(Levin, Irvine, & Nguyen, 2006, p. 3). To determine which MLS architectures are best to 
employ given specific scenarios, it is important to perform comparative analysis of such 
architectures. There are no metrics or official common framework to understand what MLS 
architecture is best to use (Levin, Irvine, & Nguyen, 2006, p. 3). Since these researchers 
did not have official metrics to understand MLS architectures, they used factors such as: 
allocation of security functionality, ability to enforce the principle of least privilege, 
factoring and reusability, runtime resource management, scalability of label space, 
dynamic security policies, trustworthiness and evaluability, controlled interference, and 
intransitive information flow (Levin, Irvine, & Nguyen, 2006, p. 8).  
That research report states that “[a]fter years of experimentation with alternative 
techniques, it is apparent that the existence of different levels of data sensitivity in 
automated environments with heterogeneously-trusted users still calls for multilevel-secure 
IT systems” (Levin, Irvine, & Nguyen, 2006, p. 10).  
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An example of an MLS architecture that is specifically purposed to support data 
aggregation and services with varying data classification levels is the Monterey Security 
Architecture (MYSEA) (Ong, Nguyen, & Irvine, 2008, p. 294). Researchers tested the 
MYSEA architecture and found that is fully functional and properly enforces MAC and 
DAC policies (Ong, Nguyen, & Irvine, 2008, p. 303).  
4. Further MLS Research 
Some argue that “while there continues to be innovation and research aimed at true 
MLS at different commercial companies, progress will likely continue to be slow compared 
to research and development aimed at producing products for a much broader market” 
(Tipton & Nozaki, 2010, p. 70). The military has a valid need for dealing with various 
classification levels in different domains. To an extent, the private sector also has this need 
(especially in the financial industries) but not as much as the DoD.  
It appears that “the huge DoD research programme on MLS has disappeared, MLS 
equipment is no longer very actively promoted on the government-systems market, and 
systems have remained fairly static…for [the last] decade. Most government systems now 
operate system high – that is, entirely at Official, or at Secret, or at Top Secret” (Anderson, 
2018, p. 303). This sentiment is also echoed in the Air Force Research Lab’s (AFRL) 
Survey of Collaboration Technologies in Multi-Level Security Environments. It states that 
“[b]ased on the literature reviewed and the finding that little has been done in the MLS 
domain to assist team performance and decision making through improved 
collaboration…The approach is drawn from a combination of existing technologies and 
some technologies that seem feasible, but may not have been developed yet” (Crabtree & 
Ianni, Survey of Collaboration Technologies in Multi-level Security Environments, 2014, 
p. 20).  
C. CONCLUSION 
Today’s warfighting environment will integrate both joint and coalition forces, 
increasing the requirement to share data between differing security domains and platforms. 
MLS can aid in this collaboration process. As this chapter shows, considerable research  
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has proven that an MLS approach is possible, practical, and secure. Yet, for many reasons, 
both the DoD and IC are reticent to employ these capabilities. These significant 
considerations required to fully adopt this technology are discussed in Chapters III  
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III. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY TECHNOLOGY, ASSESSMENT, 
AND AUTHORIZATION 
This chapter provides an overview of Multi-Level Security (MLS) systems and 
Cross Domain Solutions (CDSs) concepts, definitions, and authorization processes.  
A. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY AND CROSS DOMAIN SOLUTIONS 
The concept of an MLS system is one in which a user on a single workstation is 
able to access all security domains. MLS systems can be especially valuable when 
constraints of size, weight, power, and cooling make use of separate networks and 
computers challenging.  
Research from 2006 describes the four basic functions that MLS systems strive to 
provide, all of which are still relevant today:  
• provide, separate, and monitor flows between policy equivalence 
classes  
• MLS policy interpretation and enforcement – which includes 
allowing high to read from low 
• Mediation of a relaxed MLS policy – whereby high information can 
be securely transitioned to low domains, when appropriate  
• Ability to enforce the principle of least privilege on the activity of 
subjects – to support accountability and confinement of damage 
(Irvine & Nguyen, 2006, p. 10).  
National-level MLS policy forums are hosted by the National Security Agency’s 
Committee on Security Systems (CNSS). The CNSS provides a national level framework 
by which the U.S. Navy and all U.S. government departments and agencies derive their 
own cybersecurity policies and guidance. It provides a comprehensive forum for strategic 
planning and operational decision-making to protect national cybersecurity systems. This 
thesis uses their definition summaries for the purposes of readability and consistency. 
The CNSS defines Multi-Level Security (MLS) as a concept used to describe one 
type of a Cross Domain Solution (CDS). CDSs ensure that only authorized data is able to 
cross incompatible security classification, releasability, or sensitivity perimeters.  
12 
There are three types of CDSs: Access, Transfer and Multi-Level. The latter 
includes MLS systems. Figure 1 is an overview of the types of CDSs. Appendix A will 
further discuss the red text portion of Figure 1.  
 
 Types of Cross Domain Solutions Based on Functionality. 
Adapted from CDS Design and Implementation Requirements. 
Source: National Cross Domain Strategy and 
Management Office (2020). 
An Access CDS provides access to the data (not transfer of the data) across domains 
of differing security classification while maintaining strict network separation. For 
example, an Access CDS provides users with a remote desktop to access each connected 
security domain without allowing data transfers between security domains. Usually access 
is allowed from a higher security domain to a lower security domain. 
Transfer CDS’ enable the movement of data between domains. This action is 
completed by a process called regrading, which changes the security label to an appropriate 
level according to the receiving security domain (National Cross Domain Strategy and 
Management Office, 2020, p. 37). For example, a Transfer CDS can be used to make sure 
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that a document held at the TS level is properly declassified when downgraded and sent to 
an unclassified system. A Transfer CDS can also automatically upgrade a Secret document 
to Top Secret if Top Secret data is added to the document. The overhead associated with 
regrading (upgrading or downgrading a file to change the security label when content is 
added or taken away) depends on the specific transfer CDS implementation. For example, 
some transfer CDS technology may have the ability to automatically regrade based on 
“dirty word” searches. An example of a dirty word may include specific words or phrases 
that are classified and should not be transferred to a lower security domain. A transfer CDS 
may automatically upgrade a document to a higher classification level if it contains dirty 
words that are not allowed at the destination domain. Although some of these transfer CDS 
processes can be automatic, humans are still typically required. For example, a human may 
need to determine if the document should be upgraded due to data aggregation. According 
to the CNSS, data aggregation is the “[c]ompilation of individual data systems and data 
that could result in the totality of the information being classified, or classified at a higher 
level, or of beneficial use to an adversary” (Committee on National Security Systems, 
2015, p. 47). For example, the compilation of many individual pieces ofunclassified data 
may produce Secret data.  
1. Multi-Level CDS  
A Multi-Level Cross Domain Solution “uses trusted labeling to store data at 
different classifications and allows users to access the data based upon their security 
domain and credentials” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 84). An MLS 
CDS is a special case of a Transfer CDS (National Cross Domain Strategy and 
Management Office, 2020, pp. 36-37). A user must be explicitly granted access to perform 
“trusted labeling.” For example, if a Top Secret (TS) user modifies a Secret file, then a new 
TS file with the same name will be created by the Multi-Level CDS when the content is 
saved. The Secret file will not be changed because changing the label (i.e., regrading) is a 
trusted operation that must be explicitly granted to a user. A Multi-Level CDS can enforce 
rules that automatically upgrade a file from unclassified to Secret (and store it at the Secret 
level) if data aggregation warrants its upgrade, or if a Secret piece of data is added to the 
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document. Some organizations include Multi-Level CDS within the category of a Transfer 
CDS. Appendix A will discuss the reason for this categorization. 
Multi-Level security is the concept that describes what Multi-Level CDSs 
accomplish. The two terms are often used interchangeably. The CNSS defines MLS as a 
“[c]oncept of processing information with different classifications and categories that 
simultaneously permit access by users with different security clearances and denies access 
to users who lack authorization” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2015, p. 84). 
This enables a warfighter with TS credentials to see data at the unclassified, Confidential, 
Secret, and TS levels all on the same screen (based on the user’s clearance and need-to-
know, as well as the classification level of the data). A Sailor with unclassified credentials 
can only access unclassified data when logging into the same computer workstation. Figure 
2 illustrates this concept.  
 
 MLS Track Management View. Source: SPAWAR (2016). 
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2. MLS Considerations 
When people picture an operational environment on a ship, such as the Combat 
Information Center (CIC), their descriptions will likely mirror the following: CIC is a semi-
dark room where users sit at their workstation in front of a Windows Operating System 
(OS) with a Microsoft Office product open on their desktop to read the latest mission details 
on Powerpoint, as well as their equipment manual on PDF. Each of the user’s operational 
screens (for example, a picture of air or surface tracking information) feeds into the 
Common Operational Picture (COP) in the front of CIC, which is used to fuse operational 
displays from each of the workstations spread across the room. The COP is also on a 
Windows OS and integrates with commercial applications such as Microsoft Office. This 
setup is familiar and comfortable to operators across the DoD. However, with the proper 
implementation of a true MLS environment, this scenario would not be feasible. A true 
MLS environment would disallow the use of a Windows OS and popular commercial 
products, such as Microsoft Office, Adobe PDF, and Skype, as discussed in the next 
section.  
All users who work in these operational environments, such as CIC, are required to 
have a Secret clearance, at minimum. There are portions of CIC that are Top Secret, but 
their screens are hidden from most users in CIC who only have a Secret clearance. Today’s 
DoD traditional CDS environments typically consist of users who are on a single network 
(e.g., Secret Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRnet]). In these traditional CDS 
architectures, a CDS data guard is used to maintain the logical separation of security 
domains, and they are also used to transfer or access data between security domains (Reed, 
2004, p. 1-1). For example, Radiant Mercury is a data guard that “provides an automated 
means to sanitize, downgrade, guard, and transliterate formatted data at various 
classifications, compartments and releasabilities” (Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation, Navy, 2013, p. 1). Refer to Figure 3 for a visual representation of data guards. 
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 Traditional CDS Architecture with Data Guards.  
Adapted from Reed (2004).  
a. Traditional CDS architectures allow the use of Windows OS and 
commercial applications—at the cost of limiting other potential DoD 
seeks 
This traditional CDS architecture allows for CIC users to have a Windows OS with 
their commercial Microsoft applications, because the users are on a single network  
(e.g., SIPR). Although this CDS architecture affords the benefits of using a popular 
Windows OS and widely used applications, these advantages limit other potential uses that 
the DoD needs.  
For example, many warfighters desire the ability to run different classifications of 
data at the same time on the same network, while simultaneously allowing coalition 
partners on that same network to facilitate C2 and information-sharing (Koelsch, 2013, p. 
14). Since this traditional CDS architecture uses a Windows OS on a single network and 
allows the use of popular applications, it cannot safely allow coalition partners to access 
the same network without major security risks. More specifically, the Windows OS: 
bases access decisions only on user identity and ownership without 
considering additional security-relevant criteria such as the 
operation and trustworthiness of programs, the role of the user, and  
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the sensitivity or integrity of the data. As long as users or 
applications have complete discretion over objects, it will not  
be possible to control data flows or enforce a system-wide security 
policy. Because of such weakness of [the Windows OS], it is  
rather easy to breach the security of [the] entire system once an 
application [such as Microsoft Word] has been compromised. 
(Yang, 2003, p. 3).  
For example, it is unsafe to allow other countries to connect directly to the DoD 
network because the DoD’s systems have “No foreign nationals” (NOFORN) data on them. 
This means that material that is supposed to be US-eyes only can easily be compromised 
through applications (Phillips, Ting, & Demurjian, 2020, p. 90) if other countries were 
allowed to directly connect. Although certain precautions can be taken to share only 
coalition data, the Windows OS does not understand labeling and therefore cannot safely 
separate NOFORN material from coalition partner material (Conrad, Misenar, & Feldman, 
2010, p. 42). For example, it would not be feasible for both Israel and Saudi Arabia to each 
have a bilateral connection with the U.S. on the same network because the Windows OS 
technology does not have the ability to segregate the data in a secure manner (Ceranowicz 
& Smith, 2020, p. 2). First, the DoD would not want to risk exposing its NOFORN Secret 
data to either country by allowing them to be on the same network as the U.S. Additionally, 
both Israel and Saudi Arabia would likely not want to risk exposing their data to each other 
by being on the same Secret network as each other with no ability for the Windows OS to 
segregate the data properly.  
b. MLS architectures allow better flexibility in sharing joint and coalition 
data—at the cost of disallowing the safe use of Windows OS and 
commercial applications 
The introduction of a true MLS environment with SELinux aids in the ability to 
allow easier data sharing with joint and coalition partners. However, MLS requires an even 
greater need than traditional CDS architectures to precisely protect the data, because unlike 
traditional CDS architectures, unclassified, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret data all 
reside in a single MLS security domain (Raytheon, 2007, p. 8). See Figure 4 for a visual 




 Traditional CDS vs MLS Architectures. Source: Raytheon (2007).  
c. Some popular applications do not adequately support labeling 
requirements inherent to MLS 
MLS requires security labels. Security labels in the military security model consist 
of “two components: a security level with one of the four ratings: unclassified, confidential, 
secret, and top secret…[and] a set of zero or more categories…For example, (TS, {Crypto, 
Nuclear})” (Yang, 2003, p. 4). Labels provide the ability for users to query data according 
to their permission levels, which is required in an MLS environment. For example, a Secret 
user could see all Secret and below data from their workstation, while an unclassified user 
on that same machine would see only unclassified information. Unfortunately, neither the 
Windows OS nor popular commercial applications such as Microsoft Office and Adobe 
products support the enforced security labeling that MLS requires (Anderson, 2008, pp. 
256, 267-270). 
To fully implement a true MLS architecture, custom label-aware bespoke 
applications are required. Standard commercial applications do not have the ability to 
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enforce security labels on them and are therefore not authorized on MLS systems. All 
applications that are to be used on an MLS system must be label-aware; new label-aware 
applications must be created and maintained. The military has moved away from bespoke 
(customized) applications and it also has recently emphasized the need to leverage industry 
partnership to obtain relevant technology (Shanahan, 2018a, p. 8).  
Label-aware applications will require development and additional maintenance 
considerations. The military wants to live in a world where it evolves quickly with 
technology. This goal becomes difficult to achieve with an MLS CDS because every time 
it undergoes changes it has to be re-tested.  
The next section describes the lengthy assessment and authorization process 
required for CDSs, including MLS.  
B. CDS ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION PROCESS OVERVIEW 
This section outlines the CDS (including MLS) Assessment and Authorization 
(A&A) processes for different classification levels. It also describes the different approval 
process requirements based on General Service (GENSER), Sensitive Compartmented 
Information (SCI), or Special Access Program (SAP) systems. More detailed information 
is included in Appendix B.  
1. GENSER CDS Approval Process 
The term “GENSER” refers to classified information that does not utilize security 
protections higher than Confidential, Secret, and TS information. For example, TS with 
SCI does not follow under a GENSER system, because TS/SCI is a higher security 
protection than TS. A brief overview of the GENSER CDS approval process is provided 
in the Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD IT Instruction (DoDI 8510.01). The 
GENSER CDS approval process is further detailed in the Cross Domain (CD) Policy 
(DoDI 8540.01). The broad overview of the approval process is provided in Figure 5.  
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 DoD CD and RMF Process. Source: DoD Chief Information 
Officer (2017). 
At the end of each step, CDS documentation is reviewed by the Cross Domain 
Technical Advisory Board (CDTAB). The CDTAB feeds its recommendations at each step 
to the Defense Information Assurance (IA)/Security Accreditation Working Group 
(DSAWG). The DSAWG’s stamp of approval after steps 1, 3, 5, and 6 is required prior to 
entering the next step. Although the CDTAB and DSAWG offer approval after each step, 
the Authorizing Official (AO) authorization is required prior to final DSAWG or DoD 
ISRMC CDS approval (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 41).The DSAWG makes 
connection approval recommendations to the DoD Information Security Risk Management 
Committee (ISRMC), which holds the final risk decision authority for all Defense 
Information System Network (DISN) connections. The ISRMC may choose to delegate 
that final risk decision responsibility to DSAWG for an enterprise CD service or CDS 
(DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 11). 
The GENSER Assessment and Authorization (A&A) process adds further 
complexity with several iterations of the Cross Domain Technical Advisory Board 
(CDTAB) and Defense Information Assurance (IA)/Security Accreditation Working 
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Group (DSAWG) reviews, as shown in Figure 6. These layers of approval add additional 
oversight that can slow CDS adoption. 
 
 DoD CDS Connection Process Diagram. Source: Defense 
Information Systems Agency (2016). 
2. SCI and SAP Systems 
The DoD Joint SAP Implementation Guide (JSIG) governs the DoD SAP 
cybersecurity and it also provides standardized security and policies for all networks, 
systems, and components that fall under the cognizance of the DoD SAP Central Office 
(SAPCO) and DoD Service/Agency SAPCOs (Special Access Program Office, 2016, pp. 
1-2). It charters the Joint SAP Cybersecurity Working Group (JSCS WG) to provide DoD 
SAP cybersecurity implementation guidance (Special Access Program Office, 2016, pp. 1-
2).  
This JSIG outlines six RMF steps (categorize, select, implement, assess, authorize, 
monitor), which are the same broad categories as the GENSER RMF categories depicted 
in Figure 5. One major difference is that the SCI/SAP systems do not contain a Pre-RMF 
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step depicted at the top of Figure 5. Similar to the DoD CD Policy that details specific 
actions required under each RMF process, the JSIG also lists specific tasks and 
documentation that are required outputs from each step.  
The SCI/SAP process requires different documents and specific outputs of each 
step compared to the GENSER process. However, the functionality of each step is 
generally similar. For example, the first step in both the GENSER and SCI/SAP systems 
requires CDS categorization. The SCI/SAP process detailed in the JSIG accomplishes this 
task by directing the IS owner to assign an Information System Security Engineer (ISSE) 
to work with each other to categorize the IS and document the results in the System Security 
Authorization Agreement (SSAA)/System Security Plan (SSP). The ISSE is responsible 
for conducting IS security engineering activities (Special Access Program Office, 2016, 
pp. 1-20). The roles of the ISSE in this step appears similar to the roles of the GENSER’s 
Cross Domain Support Element (CDSE). In the GENSER process, CDSEs are established 
at the DoD Component level (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 16). Although the 
ISSE and CDSE’s responsibilities appear similar, the SAP/SCI process states that the IS 
Owner (ISO) holds the responsibility to assign an ISSE at program inception, which is a 
lower level than a DoD Component level (Special Access Program Office, 2016, pp. 2-30). 
Additionally, a cursory glance of the JSIG appears to show less overhead within 
the CDS approval process for SAP/SCI systems. For example, there are not several 
iterations of review boards (such as the CDTAB and DSAWG reviews required in the 
GENSER CDS approval process) that are intertwined throughout the SCI/SAP CDS 
approval process.  
C. DOD AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S CDS POLICIES 
The DoD and Intelligence Communities (IC) implement three major policies in this 
arena, namely the DoD’s Cross Domain (CD) policy, the IC’s Intelligence Community 
Directive (ICD) 503, and the Raise the Bar (RTB) standards relevant to both the DoD  
and IC.  
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a. DoD Cross Domain Policy 
The Department of Defense Cross Domain Instruction provides the policy, 
responsibilities, and procedures pertaining to the interconnection of different security 
domains using CDSs (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 1). This instruction applies 
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Office of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant 
Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, the 
DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD. These entities 
are referred to collectively as “DoD Components” (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, 
p. 1). Although this instruction encompasses a wide array of entities, it does not alter or 
supersede the policies that govern DoD ISs with CDSs connected to TS/SCI security 
domains. The policies that govern TS/SCI ISs are established by the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), as shown in part B.  
The DoD’s CD policy states that the: 
DoD will employ existing enterprise CD service provider’s 
(ECDSP’s) enterprise CD service or enterprise-hosted CDS when 
their use satisfies the CD mission requirements of DoD 
Components. Leveraging another operational CDS, deployment of 
a CDS baseline list point to point CDS or development of a new CD 
technology will be considered as alternative solutions only when an 
enterprise solution cannot meet the CD capability requirements. 
(DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 2) 
This requirement means that when possible, CDS deployment should consist of 
pre-established enterprise CDSs, modified versions of the pre-established enterprise CDSs, 
or existing non-enterprise CDS/MLS solutions. The procurement and deployment of 
completely new CDS/MLS solutions are usually the last resort. Although this practice is 
typical, given some of the benefits associated with MLS, it can be argued that it may be 
beneficial to adopt varying degrees of MLS architectures depending on one’s operational 
environment and mission needs.  
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b. Intelligence Community Directive Number 503 
The Director of National Intelligence establishes many IT policies and procedures 
apart from other DoD components. These unclassified policies do not appear to be updated 
as frequently as the unclassified DoD component policies, potentially since the IC is known 
to operate at more classified levels. The Intelligence Community’s IT system security risk 
management is covered by Intelligence Community Directive Number 503, “Intelligence 
Community Information Technology Systems Security Risk Management, Certification 
and Accreditation” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008, p. 1). This ICD 
applies to: 
the IC, as defined by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 
and other departments or agencies that may be designated by the 
President, or designated jointly by the Director of National 
Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned as 
an element of the IC. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
2008, p. 1) 
c. RTB Standards 
In addition to the DoD’s CD policy and the IC’s ICD 503, continuously updated 
RTB standards are published annually by the NCDSMO to detail CDS Design and 
Implementation Requirements (National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 
2020, p. 1). In actuality, the RTB standards are published every few months to address 
changes due to threats. The frequency to which this document is consistently updated 
shows the DoD’s commitment to update its CDS policies. Constraints on which version  
of the RTB standards can be used are cumbersome. For example, “a CDS entering [Lab-
Based Security Assessment] in 2023 would be allowed to use the 2020, 2021, 2022, and,  
if available, the 2023 version of this document. But it would not be able to use the 2019  
version. It is recommended that the latest released version of this document be used”  
(National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2020, p. 25). As shown by the RTB 
timeline summary in Table 1, CDS technologies have finite deployment timelines, which (by 
paper) enforces the retirement of old technology (National Cross Domain Strategy and 
Management Office, 2020, p. 25). Further information detailing the RTB standards are shown 
in Appendix A. 
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Table 1. RTB Requirements Baseline Release Timeline. Source: National 




Successful implementation of CDSs (including MLS) will facilitate the ability to 
seamlessly transfer and/or access shared data between Joint and coalition forces—enabling 
coordination between forces in conflict. However, lengthy approval processes slow the 










IV. DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NAVY 
This chapter looks at MLS in a future context – a digitally transformed Navy. 
Numerous intersecting strategies were promulgated in the last 12–18 months to initiate and 
guide the transformation.  
A. STRATEGIES 
The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to find ways to expand the narrowing gap 
between near-peer competitors. The next Global Power Competition (GPC) will likely 
require all physical domains to work together in a synergistic manner to seize the objective. 
It is difficult to seamlessly integrate Command and Control (C2) and other decision-
making data within one physical domain, but that challenge to assimilate data becomes 
even more magnified when it comes from all physical domains spanning coalition forces 
from across the world  (Erwin, 2013, p. 2). The team that is able to leverage and make risk 
decisions using data in the most effective, secure way possible is likely to win the next 
GPC conflict (Shanahan, 2018b, pp. A-4).  
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that “[w]e must anticipate the 
implications of new technologies on the battlefield, rigorously define the military problems 
anticipated in future conflict, and foster a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-
taking” (Mattis, 2018, p. 8). Implementation of the NDS requires the Joint Force and 
mission partners to employ command and control systems that will ensure speed in 
decision-making and operational advantage. Commanders will increasingly automate their 
access to and analysis of data to feed their decision-making process. 
The data will come from many different sensors, and it will be labeled and stored 
at multiple classification levels. These systems are traditionally hosted on different 
classification enclaves and will need to transfer information between incompatible security 
domains or levels of classification via a Cross Domain Solution (CDS). To realize the NDS 
vision, MLS systems will be embedded throughout All-Domain Operations (a concept that 
will be discussed later in this chapter).  
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B. DOD DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 
The DoD’s Digital Modernization Strategy is the roadmap that supports the 
National Defense Strategy implementation through the shift to technologies such as cloud 
storage and AI.  
The DoD’s Digital Modernization Strategy, first released in 2019, presents DoD 
Information Technology (IT) modernization goals to support the NDS. It states that, 
“[m]odernization of the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), a key component 
of Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN), will provide critical 
enhancements necessary to fully realize the benefits of cloud computing, big data analytics, 
mobility, Internet of Things (IoT), increased automation and cognitive computing” 
(Norquist, 2019, p. 14).  
The introduction of technologies such as cloud computing has created a need for 
new strategies to address their use. In the last 12–18 months, DoD and Navy strategies have 
been released for AI, Cloud, Digital Modernization, Big Data, and Internet of Things (IoT). 
There are several big data strategies, such as the Federal Data Strategy released June 2019, 
the DoD’s Data Modernization Strategy released Jul 2019, and the Navy Data Strategy 
released in 2017 (Cyber Security and Information Systems Information Analysis Center, 
2020, p. 1).  
Three additional strategies, for Cyber Risk, IT Reform and C3 are being drafted. 
The strategies are shown in Figure 7.  
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 Emergent Technology Strategies. Source: Norquist (2019). 
Out of these broad categories, the DoD CIO’s specific priorities in digital 
modernization are: cybersecurity, AI, cloud, and command, control, and communications 
(C3) (Norquist, 2019, p. 4). Further, the DoD Digital Modernization Strategy states that:  
[c]loud is the foundation upon which DoD will build and scale more 
effective cybersecurity, advanced analytical capabilities, better 
command and control, and future enabling technologies. This 
foundation will enable the Department to organize massive amounts 
of data and support rapid access to information for improved 
decision-making, preserving and extending our military advantage. 
To better take advantage of this information, the optimized 
enterprise cloud environment will also provide a platform for 
advanced capabilities such as machine learning (ML) and AI that 
are necessary to increase decision-making quality, speed, and 
lethality. DoD will partner with industry to securely deliver 
commercial cloud capabilities in alignment with mission 
requirements and will manage these capabilities across the 
enterprise. (Norquist, 2019, pp. 15-16).  
As the DoD Modernization Strategy alludes to, cloud computing is the foundation 
that will enable data organization to support improved decision-making, and the DoD is 
leveraging the capability that cloud computing brings to the fight. In September 2017, 
former Defense Deputy Secretary Patrick Shanahan issued a memo titled, “Accelerating 
Cloud Adoption,” which announced that the Department would make a rapid cloud 
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adoption. A few months later the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) strategy 
document was released to solicit industry-based cloud solutions for the DoD’s unclassified, 
Secret, and Top Secret (TS) storage. 
1. Cloud Strategy 
The adoption of cloud computing is not new to individual agencies within the DoD, 
but it is new in terms of considering enterprise-wide practice. In 2009, the federal 
government started to shift its data storage needs to cloud-based services and away from 
agency-owned data centers. The shift to cloud-based services increased after Executive 
Branch of the U.S. government released top level guidance in 2010. This 25-Point Plan 
provided guidelines for agencies to shift to a “Cloud First” policy, and mandated agencies 
to implement cloud-based solutions whenever a secure, reliable, cost-effective cloud option 
existed (Kundra, 2010, p. 7) As a result, in 2018 the DoD maintained over 500 public and 
private cloud infrastructures that supportunclassified and Secret requirements, many of 
which were supported by the same major industry leaders (yet the DoD manages those 
contracts individually, vice the enterprise level) (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2018, p. 1). 
According to a Combined Congressional Report that addresses JEDI cloud 
computing and a framework for the Department to acquire cloud computing services, “[t]he 
hundreds of cloud initiatives have created numerous seams, incongruent baselines and 
additional layers of complexity for managing data and services at an enterprise level” (DoD 
Chief Management Officer, 7). The Report states that this lack of a DoD-wide cloud 
initiative inhibits the ability to access, analyze, and share critical data; a skill requirement 
if the DoD wants to expand the narrowing gap between near-peer competitors. 
The DoD’s Cloud Strategy was released in December 2018 (Shanahan, 2018b, p. 
1). It states that “[d]ata stored in an enterprise DoD cloud will be highly available, well-
governed, and secure. Data will be the fuel that powers those advanced technologies, such 
as [Machine Learning] ML and AI” (Shanahan, DOD Cloud Strategy, 2018b, p. 5). Further, 
it states that: 
DoD must enable decision makers to use modern data analytics, 
such as Al and machine learning (ML), at the speed of relevance to 
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make time-critical decisions rapidly in the field to support lethality 
and enhanced operational efficiency… This critical decision making 
data will be made available through modem cloud networking, 
access control, and cross domain solutions to those who  
require access. Common data standards will be a key part of  
the Department’s methodology for tagging, storing, accessing,  
and processing information. (Shanahan, DoD Cloud Strategy,  
2018b, p. 5) 
2. Artificial Intelligence Strategy 
The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy, released 12 February 2019, was a few 
months prior to the release of the DoD’s Digital Modernization Strategy (Cronk, 2019, p. 
1). The AI Strategy states that AI leadership will take steps to ready existing AI applications 
simultaneous to the Department’s efforts to create a common foundation of shared data and 
cloud services (DOD Chief Information Officer, 2019b, p. 7). It states that when a common 
foundation of shared data, cloud services, and AI are “[t]aken together, these enterprise-
wide changes promote the spread of adaptable problem-solving using AI, increase the rate 
of experimentation and speed of delivery, and streamline the scaling of successful AI 
prototypes” (DOD Chief Information Officer, 2019b, p. 7). This statement means that 
cloud services enable effective use of emergent technologies, such as AI, since cloud 
services enable a common foundation for users to leverage shared data.  
Cross Domain Solutions address access control and require common data 
standards. The MLS type of CDS is especially useful for tagging data, as discussed in 
Chapter III. These strategies echo the view that cloud computing will be a key enabler of 
the DoD’s ability to use technologies as they emerge.  
Maintaining an abundance of data under a DoD-wide cloud and AI initiatives 
promises to increase efficiencies in many parts of the Department, including to: 
• Enable Exponential Growth  
• Scale for the Episodic Nature of the DoD Mission  
• Proactively Address Cyber Challenges  
• Enable AI and Data Transparency  
• Extend Tactical Support for the Warfighter at the Edge  
• Take Advantage of Resiliency in the Cloud  
• Drive IT Reform at DoD (Shanahan, 2018b, p. 3) 
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As the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense enact the guidance in the Digital 
Modernization Strategy, it will be necessary to determine the best CDS environment to 
access this data with the highest confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) to increase 
the speed at which warfighters can make accurate and informed decisions.  
C. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY IN ALL-DOMAIN OPERATIONS 
The United States is gearing up for the next major conflict with the deployment of 
a concept known as All-Domain [warfighting] Operations. This concept has evolved over 
the past few years and was originally known as Multi-Domain Battle, followed more 
recently by the term Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). All-Domain Operations is a joint 
warfighting concept with a vision to integrate and share kinetic and non-kinetic battle data 
from the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains, to make decisions and fight at 
machine-to-machine speed. This vision assumes cloud storage, AI, and wide use of labeled 
data. MLS is included in this concept.  
Command and control (C2) in All Domain Operations is being explored as part of 
the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The U.S. Air Force is the Executive 
Agent of JADC2. The U.S. Air Force’s initial All-Domain Operations wargames (formerly 
known as Multi-Domain Command and Control) determined that the “[c]urrent [C2] 
structure is not optimized for the Multi-Domain fight and is only possible if we...develop 
coalition compatible, Multi-Level Security, shared Multi-Domain SA technical solutions” 
(Air Force Lessons Learned, 2018, p. 29). The end of the report more bluntly stated that, 
“Multi-Level security solutions are mandatory for effective information sharing” (Air 
Force Lessons Learned, 2018, p. 75).  
All-Domain Operations and JADC2 concepts include the plan for data to span 
multiple classification levels from various systems across the DoD and coalition partners. 
Thus, it will require CDSs (such as MLS) to enable the transfer or access of this data. The 
JADC2 is further detailed in Appendix C (an FOUO appendix). 
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
This thesis views the adoption of technology, specifically Multi-Level Security 
(MLS), through three lenses. Chapter III looked at MLS technology and processes. Chapter 
IV considered how MLS can integrate into a digitally transformed Navy operating in All-
Domain Operations, a different context than our Navy today. This chapter looks at the 
institutional change needed to sustain adoption by considering organizational issues.  
Adoption of new technology requires that organizations change. If adoption is 
sustained, people within those organizations will do their work differently than they did 
before. A challenge for Navy leaders is that technology is changing rapidly while 
organizations change much more slowly. Adopting MLS systems will require a 
commitment to long term organizational change.  
Fortunately, the complex topic of organizational change is well-researched. A 
framework can be useful to organize the myriad issues associated with technology 
adoption. The framework used in this research is the Organizational Design Star Model™ 
developed by Jay R. Galbraith in the 1960s (Galbraith, 2020, p. 1). While the framework 
includes many subcomponents, only the ones applicable to adopting an MLS strategy are 
discussed.  
A. STRATEGY  
Strategy dictates which activities are most necessary, thereby providing the basis 
for making the best trade-offs in the organization design” (Galbraith, 2020, p. 2). The 
“strategy” design factor includes strategic communication, leadership commitment, and 
resource investments in All-Domain Operations, including technology (such as MLS). 
Strategies for digital transformation of the DoD and the Navy were discussed in Chapter 
IV. This research focuses on resources as part of the adoption strategy.  
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 Strategy and Goals. Adapted from Jansen, Gallenson,  
and Higgins (2015).  
The USAF stands out in its swift and dedicated focus to MLS resource allocation. 
The USAF’s dedication to Multi-Domain Command and Control (MDC2) led the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to name the USAF the lead to run the Joint All-
Domain Command and Control (JADC2) technical testing and tactics validation at its 
Shadow Operations Center at Nellis AFB in Nevada (Hitchens, OSD & Joint Staff Grapple 
with Joint All-Domain Command, 2019, p. 2). Followed by that testing, the USAF was 
recently named as the single authority responsible for the JADC2 program and is 
accountable to meet the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force requirements (Clark, 
Hyten: All Domain Drives Requirements Shakeup, 2020, p. 12). This designation does not 
mean that all services are required to adopt USAF JADC2 technology, but it will need to 
be interoperable with the USAF’s JADC2 core structure. Because of the USAF’s Doolittle 
Series 2018 (DS18) wargame outcome that MLS is needed for MDC2 operations, the 
JADC2 framework will likely use an MLS environment in its core structure. 
The USAF’s pre-established Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) will 
allow all platforms to simultaneously “receive, fuse, and act upon a massive collection of 
data from all [warfighting] domains instantaneously…[and additionally] ABMS will 
require, software and algorithms so that artificial intelligence [(AI)] and machine learning 
can compute and connect vast amounts of data from sensors and other sources at a speed 
and accuracy far beyond what is currently attainable” (Insinna, The Air Force just 
conducted the first test of its Advanced Battle Management System, 2019, p. 5). ABMS 
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focuses on interoperability which allows for the Services to not necessarily be required to 
use all of the USAF’s systems that integrate into ABMS if it does not make sense for the 
other Services to use them.  
Similar to the USAF, the Intelligence Community identified the importance of MLS 
systems. The National Security Act as amended in January 2020 states that the: “[Director 
of National Intelligence] shall…ensure development of information technology systems 
that include multi-level security and intelligence integration capabilities” (Senate and 
House of Representatives, 2020, p. Section 102A). In the wake of the analysis of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, the 9/11 Commission identified the need for a unity of 
effort in information sharing. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
recognized that the culture needed to shift from a “need-to-know” mentality to more of a 
“need-to-share” mentality (Best, 2011, p. 1). Subsequently, major statutory and regulatory 
changes were made to facilitate information sharing by the creation of the Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE), which was established by the Intelligence Reform and 
Prevention Act of 2004 and a direct result of 9/11 Commission recommendations to 
establish policies, procedures, and technologies to link people, systems, and information 
from government agencies” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2020). As a 
result of the ISE establishment, “[i]n law and in Federal regulations a culture of sharing 
has been established in the Intelligence Community” (Best, 2011, p. 1).  
Throughout this “information sharing” culture shift, the Intelligence Community 
implemented MLS technology in instances such as Joint Cross Domain eXchange (JCDX) 
which is an MLS intelligence tracking framework used to provide early warning of 
potential threats on a global scale (KeySoft Systems, 2020). JCDX is installed at the 
Atlantic Intelligence Center (AIC) at USACOM Headquarters; Joint Intelligence Center-
Pacific (JIPAC) at INDOPACOM headquarters; JIPAC detachment (J-DET) Yokota Air 
Force Base, Japan; and Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Molesworth in UK. The system 
enables its users to view intelligence tracking data based on the user’s access level and 
need-to-know. As briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, MLS technologies 
must be RTB-compliant. In light of the most recent RTB requirements, although JCDX 
was previously on the approved list of CDS, JCDX is no longer approved by the NCDSMO, 
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the Defense Information Assurance (IA)/Security Accreditation Working Group 
(DSAWG), or the DoD Information Risk Management Committee (ISRMC). More 
information will be provided on the approvals and authorities of these entities in the next 
chapter, but it is important to make the distinction that though JCDX was previously 
permitted, without RTB compliance it will no longer be approved without adjusting to the 
new standards.  
B. TASKS, PRACTICES, AND TECHNOLOGY 
The second component of adoption is tasks, practices, and procedures, as seen in 
Figure 9. For MLS adoption, this section focuses on two practices that drive why the Navy 
does not use MLS today, and a practice that makes it increasingly likely in the future. 
 
 Tasks, Practices, Technology. Adapted from Jansen, Gallenson, 
and Higgins (2015).  
Administrative and operational work in the Navy currently relies on the Windows 
Operating System (OS) and Microsoft Office products which do not support required MLS 
features such as security labeling and MAC, a true MLS environment will require a 
different OS (Yang, 2003, p. 3). For example, Security-enhanced Linux OS (SELinux) can 
be used: 
Security-enhanced Linux (SELinux) is a reference implementation 
of the Flask security architecture for flexible mandatory access 
control [MAC]. It was created to demonstrate the value of flexible 
mandatory access controls and how such controls could be added to 
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an operating system…[It] provides general support for the 
enforcement of many kinds of mandatory access control policies, 
including those based on the concepts of Type Enforcement®, Role-
based Access Control, and Multi-Level Security. (National Security 
Agency, 2020, p. 1) 
The Windows OS does not have the ability to segregate the data. An SELinux 
system is more suited for that operation. The SELinux system enforces labeling, so every 
time data is created, the user is forced to label it. For example, when writing a paragraph 
in a document, the SELinux enforces the user to add a label and portion mark it. Based on 
that label and the user’s assigned classification level, s/he can access data up to that level, 
as well as any associated caveats (e.g., a French person classified up to the Secret level can 
view the Secret//Rel-France and Secret//Rel NATO data). Since practices are typically 
dictated by using a Microsoft OS (vice SELinux), a hybrid-MLS approach can be taken 
with the addition of using cloud-based applications that support data labeling better than 
desktop applications. Cloud-based applications (such as Microsoft Word online) afford the 
opportunity to label data and place it in a classified cloud computing environment. The 
Intelligence Community (IC) operates in the IC GovCloud, which is a “big data fusion 
environment” (Konkel, 2018, p. 1). Cloud-based solutions are helpful to segregate data and 
pull data based on what is needed. 
The MLS database allows for the opportunity to query the data based on its security 
label. For example, it has the ability to label a user as a notional French, Saudi, U.S., etc., 
user. MLS databases are important because if a Secret user wants to query stored Secret 
data and searches “Secret,” then that user can only query data based on his or her rights. In 
other circumstances using non-SELinux OSs, the returned data would be anything that 
includes a classification of “Secret,” including “Top Secret” data. MLS ensures that a user 
is only able to query data based on his or her rights, regardless of what s/he may try to 
query.  
The U.S. Air Force is moving to MLS because it solves the limitations that aircraft 
have on size, weight, power, and cooling (SWAPC). Some aircraft (such as the F-35) use 
a massive MLS switch to protect vital mission data for the entire aircraft, excluding flight-
critical systems (L3Harris, 2020, p. 1). This MLS infrastructure consists of two pods that 
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sit below the pilot; and the operational plans work at the unclassified level all the way up 
to secret and below interoperability (SABI). Data is passed between pods in this 
infrastructure, and software is loaded based on the mission set. The goal is to load 
operational plans up to the TS level eventually; as done with the F-22, U-2, F-18, and other 
aircraft. 
For warfighters on an aircraft, the integration of MLS systems for various mission 
sets at various classification levels makes sense to address SWAPC considerations. 
Individual infrastructure for individual classification levels and domains is not feasible 
given the SWAPC limitations that aircraft pose. Certain parts of this infrastructure also 
include sensors that are labeled at various SAP levels, and it would certainly be infeasible 
to build additional infrastructure to account for this. Typical combat missions are labeled 
at Secret/SAP, but in some cases a mission may be TS, which requires data to be processed 
up to that level for that mission. After that mission there could be a requirement to go down 
to the Secret/SAP level for the next mission. Switching infrastructure is used to segregate 
the data, and in some cases a transfer CDS is required to move data between the levels. In 
addition to air assets, MLS is popular in ground vehicles as well due to SWAPC 
considerations.  
C. STRUCTURE 
Structure includes roles and responsibilities, processes and organizations engaged 
in CDS and MLS technology authorization (Figure 10). Current assessment and 
authorization processes for MLS have been addressed in Chapter III. This section addresses 
organizational roles and how it is very complex, the special roles of standards organizations 
and how they function to support adopting new technologies, the key interorganizational 
construct of reciprocity, and lastly, how DoD organizations collaborate on adoption.  
39 
 
 Structure Design Factor. Adapted from Jansen, Gallenson,  
and Higgins (2015).  
1. Roles and Responsibilities 
Some Program of Records (PORs) have multiple authorizing officials involved in 
their approval processes, slowing down the adoption of technology at a rapid pace. 
Authorizing official determination is based on whether or not a DoD component 
wants to implement a CDS on a General Service (GENSER), SCI, or a SAP Information 
System (IS). Sometimes these delineations are not as clear because they connect various 
systems that span many different Enterprise Cross Domain Service Provider (ECDSPs). 
For the DoD and IC, the three primary general purpose ECDSPs are: 
 
• Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) for Non-Secure 
Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (NIPRNet) and Secure IP 
Router Network (SIPRNet) connections;  
• Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for NIPRNet, SIPRNet, and 
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) 
connections; and  
• United States Air Force (USAF) Secretary of the Air Force 
(SAF)/Concepts Development and Management (CDM) United 
States (US) Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation 
System (BICES) Program Office for coalition and bi-lateral 
networks including Combined Enterprise Regional Information 
Exchange System (CENTRIXS) (National Cross Domain Strategy 
and Management Office, 2019, p. 29). 
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There are also mission specific ECDSPs for Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and weather (among many other mission sets) (National 
Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2019, p. 29). AOs are designated within 
each ECDSP, and there are some ISs that require far more than one AO’s approval because 
they span multiple mission areas. These types of challenges are not unique to CDS 
technologies such as MLS; they also occur with other emergent technologies.  
For example, Project Maven is an, “AI-powered surveillance platform for 
unmanned aerial vehicles…[that gives] the government real-time battlefield command and 
control and the ability to track, tag, and spy on targets without human involvement” 
(Greene, 2019, p. 3). Because this AI platform spans regions that are covered under 
multiple AOs, the additional oversight caused by the need to gain multiple AO approval 
creates a challenge to update algorithms in a timely and consistent manner.  
More specifically, the Navy’s AO determination guide is specified through 
OPNAVINST 5239 (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2018, p. 5). It states that:  
All IT with direct connections to the Defense Information Systems 
Network (DISN) must be authorized by signature of the [Navy 
Authorizing Official (NAO)]. Any IT that was formerly authorized 
by a [Functional Authorizing Official (FAO)] that is seeking to 
connect to the DISN will follow DDCIO(N) guidance to renew their 
[Authority to Operate (ATO)] under NAO’s cognizance. This will 
be done per the requisite memorandums of understanding between 
the respective program, FAO, and the NAO. (Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2018, p. 5) 
The Navy Cybersecurity Program Instruction appoints U.S. Fleet Cyber Command 
(FLTCYBERCOM) as the NAO for all classified and unclassified and GENSER TS and 
below USN IT assets not under the cognizance of an FAO (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2018, p. 18). This instruction further states that, “NAO signature authority  
will not be delegated below the O-6/GS-15 level due to the enterprise scope of their 
cognizance. These delegations must be appointed and maintained by Commander, 
FLTCYBERCOM with a copy provided to CNO (N2N6)” (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2018, p. 18).  
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According to the Navy Cybersecurity Program Instruction, FAOs include: Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM), Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
(NAVFACENGCOM), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM), Naval 
Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWARSYSCOM), and Strategic Systems 
Programs (SSP) (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2018, p. 24). 
These FAOs provide mission area technical authority (TA) domain-expertise and 
certification authority. NAVAIRSYSCOM is the TA for, “air systems, aeronautical 
weapons systems and associated subsystems, support equipment, components and parts, 
systems integration, software, and human systems” (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2018). This instruction also states that NAVFACENGCOM is the TA for, “all 
matters related to facilities engineering policies and practices.” Additionally, it lists 
NAVSEASYSCOM as the TA for ships and ship systems, while SSP is the TA for sea-
based deterrent missile systems. Finally, it states that NAVWARSYSCOM is the TA for 
command and control (C2) systems, space systems, force level warfare systems 
architectures, and FORCEnet. NAVWARSYSCOM is also the command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) chief engineer to all other SYSCOMs 
(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2018, p. 13).  
Sometimes the lines are blurred and the IS falls under the purview of both the Navy 
Authorizing Official (NAO) and Functional Authorizing Official (FAO). The NAO states 
that, “[a]ll IT with direct connections to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) 
must be authorized by a FAO that is seeking to connect to the DISN” (Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, 2018, p. 5). However, there are examples where equipment that falls 
under both the FAO and the NAO.  
2. The Function of Standards Organizations 
Another barrier to MLS adoption is the lack of flexibility and responsiveness 
embedded in DoD standards bodies versus comparable international standards bodies. 
There are thousands of Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) throughout the 
civilian industry sector that are used to develop and publish many International Standards. 
There are over 200 SDOs used to develop standards for information and communication 
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technologies (ICT) (Schneiderman, 2015, p. 253). Addition information regarding both 
organizations is discussed in Appendix B.  
a. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
The ISO International Standard approval process is somewhat lengthy; as such, 
there is a “fast track” process to account for urgent market needs that may arise. Within 
this “fast track” framework, a consensus of ISO working group experts publish Publicly 
Available Specifications (PAS) which have a maximum life of six years (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2020a, p. 5). Outside entities apart from working groups 
are also able to use this process to transpose their specifications into an ISO/IEC standards. 
One such PAS-authorized group is the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). These PAS 
specifications are not official International Standards; however, they can either be 
transformed into an International Standard or withdrawn after the six-year life passes. This 
injected “fast track” process is shown in Figure 11.  
 
 ISO Standards Routing Process. Source: International Organization 
for Standardization (2020).  
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The PAS “fast track” process was created in October 1994 by the Joint Technical 
Committee 1 (JTC 1; purpose is to develop worldwide Information and Communications 
Technology) after its traditional paradigm was criticized due to its “slow responses to 
dynamic market pressures, ineffective efforts to develop anticipatory standards, dogged 
pursuit of perfect solutions when ‘good enough’ would be tolerable” (Yates & Murphy, 
2019, p. 259). JTC1’s procedural change to account for quick market changes was 
unprecedented. JTC1’s PAS process allows authorized PAS submitters such as W3C (PAS 
submitter status is a three-month process) to quickly turn the consortia’s publicly available 
specifications into standards (Yates & Murphy, 2019, p. 259).  
Even with this “fast track” PAS addition, JTC1’s current Strategic Business Plans 
discuss the challenges associated with the rapid pace of technological development. The 
most recent LTBP states that: 
• International Standardization, including JTC 1, is challenged to 
accelerate its processes to match the speed of market-driven product 
cycles, and to be viewed as competitive with other standardization 
organizations in the ICT Sector.  
• The need to establish national body consensus before achieving JTC 
1 approvals can also cause standards development delays, even 
though it will often be seen as an advantage to have such consensus 
before seeking international standardization.  
• The business models for ISO and IEC still rely significantly on the 
sale of International Standards (and the protection of copyright 
interests), which is a challenge for JTC 1 in the face of freely-
distributed standards from other groups.  
• Although the use of electronic collaboration tools (e.g., 
teleconferencing techniques) is rising, the travel costs required to 
participate in international standards development can be 
burdensome to some participants. Improved participation and 
development models are needed. (ISO/ETC JTC 1, 2013, p. 9) 
JTC1’s goal to produce standards in a timely manner to meet market needs is 
addressed in every one of its publicly available business plans, dating back from 1998 
(ISO/ETC JTC 1, 2013, p. 1).  
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b. Standards Development Adoption within the DoD 
The DoD has practices in place to leverage the emergent standards that Standards 
Development Organizations (SDOs) create. DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8310.01, 
“Information Technology Standards in the DoD,” establishes “policy, assigns 
responsibilities, and provides direction for identifying, developing, and prescribing DoD 
standards for information technology (IT), to include national security systems (NSS) and 
defense business systems (DBS)” (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017b, p. 1). The 
instruction further delineates that the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for IT Standards will 
track and report IT emerging technologies and standards development of interest to the 
DoD from organizations such as American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and W3C. 
More specifically, the adopted DoD standards are chosen from the source categories listed 
in Table 2.  
Table 2. DoD Standards Consideration. Source: DoD Chief Information 
Officer (2017).  
 
 
The DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.19 designates the Director, Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA) as the DoD EA for IT Standards. In this capacity, the Director, 
DISA shall:  
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[integrate], through standards, DoD information systems and 
networks serving both U.S. and authorized foreign partners…shall 
organize, chair, and participate in U.S. military IT standards bodies 
to develop, publish, and maintain established and developmental 
interoperability standards…[and] shall also represent [DoD] 
interests in Federal, nongovernmental, international, and allied IT 
standards bodies. (Director of Administration and Management, 
2006, p. 6) 
DISA maintains its list of standards via the DoD Information Technology Standards 
Registry (DISR). DISR is the unifying DoD registry for, “approved…IT and national 
security systems (NSS) standards and standards profiles” (Defense Standardization 
Program Office, 2020, p. 1). Once the DoD approves and adopts those standards, they are 
listed in the DISR. Mandated DISR standards are to be enforced above competing 
standards, while emerging DISR standards are authorized for use, but cannot be used in 
lieu of a Mandated Standard. Additionally, information/guidance standards are used to 
clarify standards but do not need to be used (Defense Standardization Program Office, 
2020, p. 1). The DISR list contains myriads of standards, and the “Information sharing 
Cross Domain Solution (CDS) Standard” from 15 January 2017 is the sole CDS-related 
standard on the DISR listing (Defense Standardization Program Office, 2020, p. 1).  
According to the Defense Standardization Program, mandated IT Standards on the 
DISR list are required to be used throughout the DoD Acquisition process and need to be 
included in Information Support Plans (ISPs). The ISP “identifies…[IT and NSS] 
information needs, dependencies, and interface requirements, focusing on interoperability, 
supportability, and sufficiency” (McCaskill, Hicks, & Kmorowski, 2020, p. 4). ISPs are 
used in the acquisition process and are mentioned in CDS-specific policies.  
DoD components are required to comply with RTB standards that are no older than 
three years, with annual CDS documentation reassessment (National Cross Domain 
Strategy and Management Office, 2020, p. 25). If it meets certain requirements, a CDS can 
potentially be deployed for up to six years before being sunset (National Cross Domain 
Strategy and Management Office, 2019, p. 25). Although these deployment timelines are 
similar to the ISO “fast track” standards that are valid for up to six years, the DoD has not 
altered this A&A process to account for rapidly evolving technology such as CDSs.  
46 
It can take at least 2–5 years to buy and procure a new CDS, and may cost $5-10 
million for development alone, notwithstanding testing costs that are likely also in the 
millions of dollars (National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2020, p. 30). 
If a DoD component wants to employ a CDS more quickly (and cheaply), it will need to 
buy (or buy and modify) a current CDS technology on the NCDSMO CDS Baseline list 
(National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2020, p. 29). Doing so, 
however, does not necessarily shorten the approval process path. There is a process to 
request for CD Urgent Operational Requirement that allows the DSAWG Chair to approve 
an administrative interim CDSA to meet the urgent operational requirement within 24–48 
hours when necessary (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 28). This process is for 
urgent requests only, and it is not something that is permanently fed into the system, such 
as the “fast track” option that the ISO process offers. 
3. Reciprocity 
The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DSCA) Assessment and 
Authorization Process Manual (DAAPM) is a living document that governs CDS 
requirements for cleared contractors participating in the National Industrial Security 
Program (NISP), which includes but is not limited to the DoD, SAPs, and Intelligence 
Communities (National Industrial Security Program Authorization Office, 2020, p. i). The 
DAAPM focuses on the adoption of common guidelines to streamline and build reciprocity 
into the Assessment and Authorization (A&A) process.  
Reciprocity, as defined in CNSSI 4009, is a “[m]utual agreement among 
participating enterprises to accept each other’s security assessments to reuse IS resources 
and/or to accept each other’s assessed security posture to share information” (National 
Industrial Security Program Authorization Office, 2020, p. 1). Though reciprocity does not 
imply blind acceptance, it does offer the ability for organizations to accept approvals by 
other organizations to connect or reuse IT without the requirement to spend time, money, 
and other resources on retesting (National Industrial Security Program Authorization 
Office, 2020, p. 1).  
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The DoD’s Cross Domain policy requires DoD components to employ existing 
Enterprise Cross Domain Service Provider’s CDSs when possible. Under this guidance, 
when a DoD component (non-TS/SCI or non-SAP) wants to employ a CD to interconnect 
systems of differing security domains, it must first look to see if its specific capability 
requirement is met by a CDS that is already on the National Cross Domain Services 
Management Office (NCDSMO) Control List, which is a CDS baseline list (DoD Chief 
Information Officer, 2017c, p. 2).  
More specific guidance for the IC via Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 503 
states that it “focuses on a more holistic and strategic process for the risk management of 
[IT] systems, and on processes and procedures designed to develop trust across the 
intelligence community [IT] enterprise through the use of common standards and 
reciprocally accepted certification and accreditation decisions” (Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, 2008, p. 1). Reciprocity is certainly emphasized in this directive. In 
regard to reciprocity, it states that, “[a]n IC element shall accept the certification of a 
system or other item of [IT] by another IC element without requiring or requesting any 
additional validation or verification testing of the system or item of IT” (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2008, p. 7).  
Though the DAAPM streamlines reciprocity for DoD components (governing non-
TS/SCI systems), it never mandates that any DoD element shall accept the certification of 
a system completed by another DoD element. The IC’s requirement for IC elements to 
accept certification from other IC elements stands in stark contrast to the non-TS/SCI DoD 
component’s guideline provided by the DAAPM.  
4. Collaboration across the DoD 
One method of policy collaboration across the DoD is shown with the Committee 
on National Security Systems (CNSS). The CNSS promulgates its cybersecurity guidance 
documents through its committees, subcommittees, panels, and working groups to provide 
the framework by which the U.S. government (USG) departments and agencies derive their 
own policies and guidance. According to its website, CNSS is the cornerstone for 
cybersecurity guidance collaboration efforts among Federal National Security Systems 
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(NSS), Federal non-NSS, and non-Federal systems. It also, “sets national-level 
cybersecurity policies, directives, instructions, operational procedures, guidance and 
advisories for U.S. government departments and agencies for the security of National 
Security Systems...It provides a comprehensive forum for strategic planning and 
operational decision-making to protect NSS and approves the release of INFOSEC 
products and information to Foreign Governments” (Committee on National Security 
Systems, 2016, p. 1). 
The adoption of international standards through organizations such as the ISO is 
helpful for interoperability and community-learned “best practices” on a worldwide scale. 
However, in this age of rapidly developing technology, there needs to be increased efforts 
within the DoD to work more collaboratively.  
NCDSMO’s baseline CDS list is a beneficial way to offer CDS technology 
collaboration and reciprocity among DoD components. Much more needs to be done to 
reduce duplicate CDS research efforts, and the JADC2 working group is a helpful start to 
tackle this issue.  
D. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
The fourth component of adoption is training and education (Figure 12). As with 
any new practice, training and education need to be modified and co evolved, as 




 Training and Education Design Factor. Adapted from Jansen, 
Gallenson, and Higgins (2020).  
The first Doolittle Series (DS18) wargame was held 6–8 November 2018 at the 
LeMay Center Wargaming Institute in Alabama.  Its central objective was to figure out 
how to manage data flows coming from all over the world from every domain: air, land, 
sea, and cyberspace. It was the inaugural event, and only included USAF, Royal AF, and 
AUS AF. The DS18 After Action report directly stated that MLS technologies must be 
leveraged for the MDC2 environment. The report stated that the “Current [C2] structure is 
not optimized for the Multi-Domain fight and is only possible if we...develop coalition 
compatible, Multi-Level Security, shared Multi-Domain SA technical solutions” (Air 
Force Lessons Learned, 2018, p. 29). The end of the report more bluntly stated that, “Multi-
Level security solutions are mandatory for effective information sharing” (Air Force 
Lessons Learned, 2018, p. 75).  
The MDC2 Capabilities Office was stood up at the Hanscom Air Force Base in 
Massachusetts focused on developing new tools and technologies to build networks and 
technology requirements for program managers to adopt their best practices. Major General 
Saltzman (formerly the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at USAF Headquarters) stated 
that Doolittle’s wargame findings caused that MDC2 office to prioritize its work on Multi-
Level Security (Cohen R. , 2018, p. 1). Around the same time as the MDC2 Capabilities 
Office establishment, MDC2 further moved from research to reality when a select group 
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of 34 mid-career officers began the USAF inaugural MDC2 training course to prepare for 
a new career field known as 13O, or “13-Oscar” in April 2019. Major General Saltzman 
expects for the 13O billets to reach around 500 billets, with around 250 majors, 125 
lieutenant colonels, and 25 colonels working on MDC2 (Saltzman, 2018, p. 16).  
E. REWARD SYSTEMS AND INCENTIVES 
As progress continues All-Domain Operations, JADC2, CDS and MLS 
development, leaders will need to align incentives for information sharing with their 
strategic goals for the same (Figure 13).  
 
 Reward Systems and Incentives Design Factor. Adapted from 
Jansen, Gallenson, and Higgins (2020).  
F. CONCLUSIONS 
The endorsement of high-level proponents for All-Domain Operations led to the 
establishment of the JADC2 Cross Functional Team (CFT) to coordinate C2 efforts 
appropriate to All-Domain Operations. The USAF and IC are increasing investments in 
MLS technology as a means to support evolving C2 mission requirements. Although higher 
authority guidance and champions for All-Domain Operations and MLS are essential, they 
are not enough to assure adoption of MLS  
Continuous evaluation of multiple areas depicted in Galbraith’s Star Model™ 
Framework may reveal areas that will lead to better integration and sustained adoption of 
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emerging CDS technology (such as MLS) into this process. However, the variety of 
organizations and cross competing processes highlight that adopting MLS across the 
services, or even within the Navy, faces formidable challenges.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, FUTURE WORK 
Many different entities inside and outside of the DoD are interested in the efficient 
adoption of emergent technologies. The failure for the DoD to adopt emergent Cross 
Domain Solution (CDS) technology in a timely manner may have larger implications than 
that of the private sector; it could determine the winner of the next Global Power 
Competition (GPC) conflict.  
The DoD is working to integrate emergent CDS technology through its 
establishment of the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) construct, the use 
of the IT Standards EA to identify international standards, and the National Cross Domain 
Solution Office (NCDSMO) CDS Baseline List to enable reciprocity. Although these 
organizations and constructs are helpful, the current CDS approval process is inadequate 
to account for emergent technology. Private standards bodies such as the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) have a “fast track,” implemented into its standards 
approval processes, yet even with these implementations it still struggles to keep up to 
speed with emergent technology. The DoD does not implement a “fast track” in its CDS 
approval process; the fastest way to integrate a CDS is by using an already-approved CDS 
on the NCDSMO Baseline list. Though this is a valid option, there are no “fast track” 
processes that allow for the integration of emergent technologies that are not already on 
this list. Additionally, several Authorizing Officials (AOs) span various projects, further 
lengthening the approval process. Many emergent technologies require frequent updates, 
which may trigger the need to go through an additional Assessment and Authorization 
(A&A) process to test the implications that those changes may have on the overall security 
of the system. Though the A&A process is lengthy for a reason, a “fast track” similar to 
the ISO is recommended, as well as a solution to require fewer AOs in the approval process 
for emerging technology that requires frequent updates.  
Multi-Level Security (MLS) technology is an example of emergent technology that 
requires a lengthy approval process. MLS technology could significantly aid in the joint 
and coalition forces’ ability to seamlessly work together in the next GPC conflict, 
especially in the age where data needs to be fused in an efficient manner to make timely 
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decisions. Though determination of which types of CDS architectures to employ depend 
on individual organization’s needs, improvements to the A&A process will significantly 
aid in emergent technology adoption once an organization determines which CDS to 
employ. Ultimately, improvement in this process will allow organizations to more 
efficiently adopt ready, relevant technology necessary to stay ahead in the GPC.  
A. PROCESS IMPROVEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Add DoD Component “Fast Track” Options to CDS RMF Process 
The DoD CDS A&A requirements do not offer a “fast track” option built into the 
Risk Management Framework (RMF) process. The General Service (GENSER) A&A 
process adds further complexity with several iterations of Cross Domain Technical 
Advisory Board (CDTAB) and Defense Information Assurance (IA)/Security 
Accreditation Working Group (DSAWG) reviews in between steps. Though this 
requirement may aid in ensuring that all security aspects are considered, by the time the 
technology is approved it may be near obsolete, or ready for another update. The ISO 
standardization process has a built-in “fast track” that is used to speed up emergent 
technology standardization.  
If a DoD component wants to employ a CDS more quickly (and cheaply), it will 
need to buy (or buy and modify) a current CDS technology on the NCDSMO CDS Baseline 
list (National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2020, p. 30). Doing so, 
however, does not necessarily shorten the approval process path. There is a process to 
request for a Cross Domain (CD) Urgent Operational Requirement that allows the DSAWG 
Chair to approve an administrative interim Cross Domain Solution Authorization (CDSA) 
to meet the urgent operational requirement within 24–48 hours when necessary (DoD Chief 
Information Officer, 2017c, p. 28). This process is for urgent requests only, and it is not 
something that is permanently fed into the system, such as the “fast track” option that the 
ISO process offers. 
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2. Consolidate MLS Efforts via JADC2 Process and Wargames 
Since CDS research is applicable to a myriad of applications, there are varying 
agencies and organizations inside and outside the DoD that are exploring the most effective 
ways to implement CDSs. Unfortunately, many of these entities’ research efforts are 
duplicated due to minimal collaboration with organizations outside their purview.  
The adoption of international standards through organizations such as the ISO is 
helpful for interoperability and community-learned “best practices” on a worldwide scale. 
However, in this age of rapidly developing technology, there needs to be increased efforts 
within the DoD to work more collaboratively. NCDSMO’s baseline CDS list is a beneficial 
way to offer CDS technology collaboration and reciprocity among DoD components. Much 
more needs to be done to reduce duplicate CDS research efforts, and the DoD-wide effort 
to form the JADC2 Cross Functional Team (CFT) is a helpful start to tackle this issue. 
Technical authority and acquisition commands, such as Naval War Systems Command 
(NAVWARSYSCOM) would benefit by keeping abreast with JADC2 CFT 
recommendations and active involvement in JADC2 wargames. Additionally, active 
involvement with the JADC2 process will afford the opportunity to investigate and 
recommend MLS adoption as the Navy becomes more engaged in cloud, AI, data labeling, 
and analysis.  
3. Investigate Potential Consolidation to a Single AO for Programs that 
Span Multiple AOs 
In addition to CDS procurement and collaboration challenges, there are Program of 
Records (PORs) that have multiple AOs involved in their approval process, which slows 
down the approval process and interferes with the rapid adoption of emergent technology. 
These challenges are not unique to CDS technologies, but also occur with other emergent 
technologies.  
For example, Artificial Intelligence (AI) platforms (such as those involved with 
Project Maven) span regions that are covered under multiple AOs. The additional oversight 
caused by the need to gain multiple AO approval creates a challenge in updating algorithms 
in a timely and consistent manner. Consideration needs to be taken to determine which 
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technology should not be required to undergo multiple AO approval, or an alternative 
process to solve this concern.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Determination of Most Pertinent Label-Aware, Web-Based 
Applications 
It is recommended that future work will provide a detailed pathway of how to adopt 
label-aware web-based applications. The Navy’s decision to adopt more MLS 
environments may not be determined until label-aware applications become mainstream. 
Bespoke label-aware application adoption may be beneficial, regardless of the Navy’s 
decision regarding MLS. 
A study such as this should consider cost analysis of developing custom 
applications, as well as determine which non-mission essential applications to develop. 
Scope creep can easily be introduced in this research area, and before one knows it, s/he 
can have many more applications required than originally thought.  
Another consideration in this area is the determination of how much the integration 
of bespoke applications creates a cultural resistance and initial lack of productivity.  
The commercial sector will more than likely continue its use of commercial applications, 
such as Microsoft Office products. Members in the military use these applications for  
both personal and professional use, and military members’ inclination to use these products 
in their spare time can potentially cut down the on-the-job training time when needed  
to use these products at work. A researcher in this area needs to consider the effects of 
using bespoke versions of everyday applications in the workplace (that are not used for 
personal use).  
2. Design a Test to Determine if a True MLS Environment Increases the 
Speed of the Commander’s Decision-Making 
To design a test for this subject, significant controls should be in place. Often times 
when presented with updated technology, a user may think that s/he “needs” that newer 
technology simply because it is new; negating the fact that it may not be essential to mission 
completion. There may also be inherent military bias, where those who are avidly against 
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MLS systems may not be open to the adoption of an MLS environment. MLS complexity 
has been around for decades, so naturally experts in this area have more than likely formed 
an opinion in one direction or another. A test like this would need to prove that the cost 
(time, training, funds, etc.) is worth it to help commanders achieve quicker and more 
effective decisions.  
This type of a test would need to incorporate real applications in a real environment, 
all with real data. It may also need to involve people who can show that they do not already 
have a biased opinion on the subject.  
3. Cost Analysis of the Value Added from an MLS Environment 
The complexities involved with MLS are astronomical, and the cost is not 
insignificant. Further research should be conducted to determine the actual cost of 
implementing a true MLS system, and whether it may be cheaper to put NOFORN on a 
separate virtualized environment with a CDS in between to transfer and access data. As 
such, research in this area should include whether the value of MLS decreases due to 
advancements in virtualization. MLS is certainly achievable with a large budget, but a cost 
analysis should be carefully considered.  
Research in this area may determine that there is very little value added by creating 
a true MLS environment for a general user-level IT, but that it may be worth it for units 
with size, weight, power, and cooling (SWAPC) considerations, such as those working 
with aircraft. If a researcher wants to try that approach, it is necessary to determine the cost 
of adding bespoke applications and Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) Operating 
Systems (OSs), since current commercial applications and Windows OS cannot be used in 









APPENDIX A.  RAISE THE BAR STANDARD 
In addition to the CNSS documents, the Raise the Bar (RTB) requirements is a 
continuously updated document that establishes the architecture and implementation 
requirements for CDSs, including MLS. All CDS developed for use to protect the USG, 
National Security Information (NSI) and National Security Systems (NSS) are required to 
implement the RTB requirements per NSA’s authorities under National Security Directive 
42 to develop standards for systems protecting NSS (National Cross Domain Strategy and 
Management Office, 2020).  
Historically, the MLS CDS was considered a separate class of CDS. This 
categorization, as defined by the CNSS standards, led to an unsecure and unsafe design 
and implementation since data filtering during reclassification was not properly 
implemented (National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2020, p. 37).  
Since MLS is re-categorized as a subtype of transfer CDS, it must meet the new 
requirements for Access and Transfer CDS, birthed out of RTB standards. One of the most 
critical requirements is hardware separation which applies to both access and transfer 
CDS—regardless of the variant used. The RTB standards timeline states that beginning in 
2021, a system can no longer connect to High Threat Networks (HTN) without hardware 
separation (National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2019, p. 34). The 
RTB efforts increase IS requirements, with hopes to combat the threats coming from HTNs.  
IAW this same guidance, an HTN is defined as, “a network in which a known or 
suspected highly skilled (e.g., nation-state or transnational organized crime level) cyber 
actor is operating” (National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office, 2020, p. 34). 
Additionally, the RTB standards recognize that an HTN may include cyber actors operating 
on the network without the knowledge of the primary user of the network.  
There are specific milestones that CDSs must meet to be considered RTB-
compliant; as discussed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. RTB CDS Deployment Increments and Implementation. Source: 
National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office (2020). 
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APPENDIX B.  CDS APPROVAL PROCESS IN COMPARISON 
TO THE ISO PROCESS 
As with any information systems (ISs) requirements in the DoD, there are many 
policies and procedures that govern CDS interconnection approval between security 
domains. Some of the entities that are engaged with this approval process manage the risk 
associated with the proposed technology, provide governance approval, and maintain a 
knowledge of current Cross Domain (CD) technology in use across the DoD. The idea of 
using IS interconnection approval processes and governing bodies are not unique to the 
DoD; however, the way in which they are carried out vary vastly between the bureaucratic 
nature of the DoD and the civilian industry sector.  
A. STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
There are thousands of Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) throughout 
the world used to develop and publish many International Standards. There are over 200 
SDOs used to develop standards for information and communication technologies (ICT) 
(Schneiderman, 2015, p. 253). One such organization that will be discussed in depth is the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  
The ISO works closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and together all three of the 
organizations form the World Standards Cooperation (WSC) to preserve and advance 
voluntary consensus-based International Standards systems (World Standards 
Cooperation, 2020, p. 1). All three of these organizations are known as some of the largest 
and most well-established standards organizations.  
1. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Structure and 
Governance 
ISO is an “independent, non-governmental organization made up of members from 
the national standards bodies of 164 countries” (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2020c, p. 1). The ISO has developed over 23,000 International Standards 
used to govern various facets of expertise such as quality management standards, 
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environmental management standards, health and safety standards, energy management 
standards, food safety standards, and finally Information Technology (IT) standards 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2020f, p. 3). Designated ISO members 
submit standards for ISO ratification that detail the best way to accomplish a wide array of 
activities ranging from process management and supply procurement to security techniques 
and controls.  
There is only one designated member authorized per country, and each member 
represents ISO in its country. There are three tiers of membership, and each tier experiences 
varying access levels and influence over the ISO system. The combination of limiting each 
country to one member, yet simultaneously assigning different tiers of membership allows 
the ISO to be inclusive while recognizing the capacity that each national standards body 
maintains. Full members (or member bodies) “influence ISO standards development and 
strategy by participating and voting in ISO technical and policy meetings. [They also] sell 
and adopt ISO International Standards nationally” (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2020b, p. 4). Correspondent members cannot vote in ISO technical and 
policy meetings, but they are authorized to sell and adopt ISO International Standards 
nationally. Subscriber members are only able to keep up to date on ISO’s work, but cannot 
participate in it. The conglomeration of members from each country forms the “General 
Assembly,” which is the ultimate authority of the ISO, and it meets annually to discuss 
strategic objectives. 
The ISO Council meets three times a year, and it forms the core governance body 
of the Organization. It consists of 20 member bodies, as well as various Policy 
Development Committees, and ISO Officers (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2020c, p. 2). These entities will not be discussed in depth, but it is 
important to note that IT advice is provided to the ISO council via the Information 
Technology Strategy Advisory Group (ITSAG). The ISO Council reports to the General 
Assembly. The Technical Management Board (TMB) manages technical ISO standards, 
and consists of Technical Committees that lead standards development and also provides 
guidance to strategic advisory boards created on technical matters. Figure 14 visually 
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depicts the ISO Governance Structure. Some of the entities mentioned in Figure 14 are not 
discussed since they are broader in scope and are not solely specific to the IT community.  
ISO Governance Structure. Source: International Organization for 
Standardization (2020c). 
There are 248 Technical Committees, and the first one is the ISO/IEC Joint 
Technical Committee (ISO/IEC JTC 1) which develops worldwide Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) standards (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2020g, p. 1). The ISO/ETC JTC1 releases a long-term business plan 
(LTBP) that is reviewed annually to outline its three to five year plans (ISO/ETC JTC 1, 
2013, p. 1). ISO/IEC JTC 1 is comprised of 22 subcommittees which cover specific 
technologies. Each subcommittee submits a yearly business plan which details specific 
working group’s deliverables, accomplishments, risks, opportunities, and issues (ISO/IEC 
JTC 1 Subcommittees, 2019, p. 1). The frequency of meetings varies per subcommittee; 
typically, subcommittees meet on an annual basis. The workhorse of the subcommittees 
are the individual working groups that are assigned specific problem sets to tackle, as 
designated by subcommittees’ yearly Business Plans. These working groups typically meet 
twice a year in person, and also hold monthly teleconferences to progress their work.  
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The Technical Committees’ (TCs) subcommittees (SCs) ultimately provide new 
work item proposals (NPs) to the TC secretariat. The ISO/IEC Consolidated JTC1 
Supplement 2017 states that when an NP is submitted, the committee secretariat shall also 
indicate the selected standards development track to adjust target dates. These development 
target dates provide 18-, 24-, 36-, and 48-month tracks to publication (ISO/IEC JTC 1 
Subcommittees, 2019, p. 1). Upon TC approval from national members from the TC (such 
as JTC1), that Final Draft international Standard (FDIS) can be submitted to the Central 
Secretariat for standardization to be published as an International Standard (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2020e, p. 1). Figure 15 shows the approval process of 
International Standards within the ISO.  
ISO Standards Routing Process. Source: International Organization 
for Standardization (2020a). 
2. ISO International Standards Approval Timeline
The ISO International Standard approval process is somewhat lengthy; as such, 
there is a “fast track” process to account for urgent market needs that may arise. Within 
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this “fast track” framework, a consensus of ISO working group experts publish Publicly 
Available Specifications (PAS) which have a maximum life of six years (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2020a, p. 5). Outside entities apart from working groups 
are also able to use this process to transpose their specifications into an ISO/IEC standards. 
One such PAS-authorized group is the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) which will be 
discussed in ensuing sections. These PAS specifications are not official International 
Standards; however, they can either be transformed into an International Standard or 
withdrawn.  
The PAS “fast track” process was created in October 1994 by JTC1 after its 
traditional paradigm was criticized due to its “slow responses to dynamic market pressures, 
ineffective efforts to develop anticipatory standards, dogged pursuit of perfect solutions 
when ‘good enough’ would be tolerable” (Yates & Murphy, 2019, p. 259). JTC1’s 
procedural change to account for quick market changes was unprecedented. JTC1’s PAS 
process allows authorized PAS submitters such as W3C (PAS submitter status is a three-
month process) to quickly turn the consortia’s publicly available specifications into 
standards (Yates & Murphy, 2019, p. 259).  
Even with this “fast track” PAS addition, JTC1’s current Strategic Business Plans 
discuss the challenges associated with the rapid pace of technological development. The 
most recent LTBP states that: 
• International Standardization, including JTC 1, is challenged to 
accelerate its processes to match the speed of market-driven product 
cycles, and to be viewed as competitive with other standardization 
organizations in the ICT Sector.  
• The need to establish national body consensus before achieving JTC 
1 approvals can also cause standards development delays, even 
though it will often be seen as an advantage to have such consensus 
before seeking international standardization.  
• The business models for ISO and IEC still rely significantly on the 
sale of International Standards (and the protection of copyright 
interests), which is a challenge for JTC 1 in the face of freely-
distributed standards from other groups.  
• Although the use of electronic collaboration tools (e.g., 
teleconferencing techniques) is rising, the travel costs required to 
participate in international standards development can be 
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burdensome to some participants. Improved participation and 
development models are needed (ISO/ETC JTC 1, 2013, p. 9). 
JTC1’s goal to produce standards in a timely manner to meet market needs is 
addressed in every one of its publicly available business plans, dating back from 1998 
(ISO/ETC JTC 1, 2013, p. 1).  
3. ISO Certification and Accreditation Authorities 
The ISO develops International Standards, but it does not provide certification and 
accreditation (C&A) of those standards. According to the ISO.org website, certification is 
the, “provision by an independent body of written assurance (a certificate) that the product, 
service or system in question meets specific requirements,” while accreditation is the 
“formal recognition by an independent body, generally known as an accreditation body, 
that a certification body operates according to international standards” (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2020a, p. 5).  
Although the ISO does not perform C&A, it does maintain a Committee on 
Conformity Assessment (CASCO) that produces many certification process standards used 
by certification bodies (International Organization for Standardization, 2020a, p. 4). Since 
C&A is not performed by ISO, a company or organization can only be certified by external 
certification bodies. The International Accreditation Forum (IAF) works in cooperation 
with ISO to accredit external certification bodies.  
4. ISO representation from the United States 
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a full member body 
designated as the ISO representation for the United States. ANSI accredits standards 
developers to establish a consensus among qualified groups, but it does not write the 
standards (International Organization for Standardization, 2020d, p. 2). The ANSI Board 
of Directors established the Executive Standards Council (ExSC) to accredit national 
standards developers and U.S. Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) to ISO (American 
National Standards Institute, 2019, p. 2). ANSI-Accredited Standards Developers are 
authorized to submit a American National Standard (ANS) to be considered as an ISO or 
ISO/IEC JTC-1 standard (American National Standards Institute, 2019, p. 5). On the other 
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hand, ANSI-Accredited U.S. TAGs fulfill the part of ANSI’s role to determine the U.S. 
position in regard to its support of a proposed International Standard. There are 220 
developers that are accredited to develop and maintain almost 10,000 ANSs, some of which 
are national adoptions of global standards (International Organization for Standardization, 
2020d, p. 2). All ANSs are voluntary documents, but many U.S. federal, state, and local 
bodies refer to ANS documentation for regulatory policy. 
B. STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE DOD 
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8310.01, “Information Technology Standards in the DoD,” 
establishes “policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides direction for identifying, 
developing, and prescribing DoD standards for information technology (IT), to include 
national security systems (NSS) and defense business systems (DBS)” (DoD Chief 
Information Officer, 2017b, p. 1). The instruction further delineates that the DoD Executive 
Agent (EA) for IT Standards will track and report IT emerging technologies and standards 
development of interest to the DoD from organizations such as ANSI and W3C. More 
specifically, the adopted DoD standards are chosen from the source categories listed in 
Table 4.  
Table 4. DoD Standards Consideration. 
Source: DoD Chief Information Officer (2017b).  
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1. DoD Executive Agent for IT Standards 
The DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.19 designates the Director, Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA) as the DoD EA for IT Standards. In this capacity, the Director, 
DISA shall:  
[integrate], through standards, DoD information systems and 
networks serving both U.S. and authorized foreign partners…shall 
organize, chair, and participate in U.S. military IT standards bodies 
to develop, publish, and maintain established and developmental 
interoperability standards…[and] shall also represent [DoD] 
interests in Federal, nongovernmental, international, and allied IT 
standards bodies. (Director of Administration and Management, 
2006, p. 6) 
2. DoD Information Technology Standards Registry (DISR) 
DISA maintains its list of standards via the DoD Information Technology Standards 
Registry (DISR). DISR is the unifying DoD registry for, “approved…IT and national 
security systems (NSS) standards and standards profiles” (Defense Standardization 
Program Office, 2020, p. 1). Once the DoD approves and adopts those standards, they are 
listed in the DISR. Mandated DISR standards are to be enforced above competing 
standards, while emerging DISR standards are authorized for use, but cannot be used in 
lieu of a Mandated Standard. Additionally, information/guidance standards are used to 
clarify standards but do not need to be used (Defense Standardization Program Office, 
2020, p. 1). The DISR list contains myriads of standards, and the “Information sharing 
Cross Domain Solution (CDS) Standard” from 15 January 2017 is the sole CDS-related 
standard on the DISR listing (Defense Standardization Program Office, 2020, p. 1).  
According to the Defense Standardization Program, mandated IT Standards on the 
DISR list are required to be used throughout the DoD Acquisition process and need to be 
included in Information Support Plans (ISPs). The ISP “identifies…[IT and NSS] 
information needs, dependencies, and interface requirements, focusing on interoperability, 
supportability, and sufficiency” (McCaskill, Hicks, & Kmorowski, 2020, p. 4). ISPs are 
used in the acquisition process and are mentioned in CDS-specific policies, to be discussed 
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in subsequent sections. Additionally, DISA’s plan to fulfill its role in facilitating military 
IT standards bodies will be discussed.  
C. IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS THAT GOVERN CDS REQUIREMENTS 
1. Cross Domain Policy: DoDI 8540.01 
The Department of Defense Cross Domain (CD) Instruction provides the policy, 
responsibilities, and procedures pertaining to the interconnection of different security 
domains using CDSs (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 1). This instruction applies 
to the OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector 
General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other 
organizational entities within the DoD. These entities are referred to collectively as “DoD 
components” (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 1). Although this instruction 
encompasses a wide array of entities, it does not alter or supersede the policies that govern 
DoD ISs with CDSs connected to TS/SCI security domains. The policies that govern 
TS/SCI ISs specifically are established by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and 
will be detailed in subsequent paragraphs. 
2. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information 
Technology (IT): DoDI 8510.01 
DoDI 8510.01 establishes the RMF process for DoD IT, establishes associated 
cybersecurity policy, and assigns responsibilities for executing and maintaining the RMF 
process (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017a, p. 1). This instruction applies to all DoD 
components that were detailed in the previous section, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard and 
all DoD-controlled IT operated by a contractor or other entity on behalf of the DoD. 
This instruction details generic actions that govern Steps 1–6 of the RMF process. 
Steps 1–6 of this process are: Categorize, Select, Implement Security Controls, Assess 
Security Controls, Authorize System, and Monitor Security Controls. These steps are 
broadly categorized in this instruction, but further detail is provided by DoDI 8540.01.  
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3. Cybersecurity: DoDI 8500.01 
DoDI 8500.01 establishes the DoD cybersecurity program to protect and defend 
DoD information and IT (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2019b, p. 1). This instruction 
also establishes and defines the roles and positions of the DoD principal authorizing official 
(PAO) and the DoD Senior Information Security Officer (SISO) and continues the DoD 
Information Security Risk Management Committee (DoD ISRMC). These roles will be 
discussed throughout the DoD standards bodies discussion and approval process. It applies 
to the same DoD components detailed in DoDI 8540.01, all DoD IT, all DoD information 
in electronic format, and SAP IT (other than SCI).  
4. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DSCA) 
Assessment and Authorization Process Manual (DAAPM) 
The DAAPM is a living document that governs CDS requirements for cleared 
contractors participating in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), which 
includes but is not limited to the DoD, SAPs, and Intelligence Communities (National 
Industrial Security Program Authorization Office, 2020, p. 3). Under the DAAPM, cleared 
contractors must follow the Risk Management Framework (RMF) process to obtain system 
authorization to implement the technology.  
The DAAPM focuses on the adoption of common guidelines to streamline and 
build reciprocity into the Assessment and Authorization (A&A) process. Reciprocity, as 
defined in CNSSI 4009, is a “[m]utual agreement among participating enterprises to accept 
each other’s security assessments to reuse IS resources and/or to accept each other’s 
assessed security posture to share information” (National Industrial Security Program 
Authorization Office, 2020, p. 1). Though reciprocity does not imply blind acceptance, it 
does offer the ability for organizations to accept approvals by other organizations to 
connect or reuse IT without the requirement to spend time, money, and other resources on 
retesting (National Industrial Security Program Authorization Office, 2020, p. 16).  
5. Executive Order Number 12333, as amended 
Though the DoDI 8540.01 Cross Domain Policy carries extensive authorities over 
DoD components, it does not alter or supersede existing authorities and policies of the 
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Director of National Intelligence (DNI) regarding the protection of SCI as directed by 
Executive Order Number 12333 (amended by Executive Order Number 13470) (Reagan, 
Ronald, 1981, p. 1). All DoD Information Systems that use CDSs to connect TS/SCI must 
comply with DNI Policy and guidance. This difference in authorities between the 
Intelligence Community (IC) and the rest of the DoD components causes variation in the 
CDS approval processes.  
6. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 503 
The Intelligence Community’s IT system security risk management is covered by 
Intelligence Community Directive Number 503, “Intelligence Community Information 
Technology Systems Security Risk Management, Certification and Accreditation” (Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008, p. 1). This ICD applies to: 
the IC, as defined by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 
and other departments or agencies that may be designated by the 
President, or designated jointly by the Director of National 
Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned as 
an element of the IC. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
2008, p. 1).  
ICD 503 states that it, “focuses on a more holistic and strategic process for the risk 
management of [IT] systems, and on processes and procedures designed to develop trust 
across the intelligence community [IT] enterprise through the use of common standards 
and reciprocally accepted certification and accreditation decisions” (Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, 2008, p. 1). Reciprocity is certainly emphasized in this directive. 
In regard to reciprocity, it states that, “[a]n IC element shall accept the certification of a 
system or other item of [IT] by another IC element without requiring or requesting any 
additional validation or verification testing of the system or item of IT” (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2008, p. 7).  
Though the DAAPM streamlines reciprocity for DoD components (governing non-
TS/SCI systems), it never mandates that any DoD element shall accept the certification of 
a system completed by another DoD element. The IC’s requirement for IC elements to 
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accept certification from other IC elements stands in stark contrast to the non-TS/SCI DoD 
component’s guideline provided by the DAAPM.  
7. Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Connection Process 
Guide (CPG) 
The CPG implements DISA’s requirement to oversee and maintain the connection 
approval process, as detailed in DoDI 8500.01 (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2019b, p. 
16). It governs DISN connection approvals for all DoD components.  
D. MAJOR STANDARDS BODIES AND ENTITIES INVOLVED IN THE 
RMF PROCESS 
At the end of each approval step, CDS documentation is reviewed by the Cross 
Domain Technical Advisory Board (CDTAB). The CDTAB feeds its recommendations at 
each step to the Defense Information Assurance (IA)/Security Accreditation Working 
Group (DSAWG). The DSAWG’s stamp of approval between each step is required prior 
to entering the next step.  
(1) Cross Domain Support Element (CDSE) 
The CDSE is responsible for managing the DoD component’s CD-related activities 
(DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017c, p. 46). The DoDI 8540.01 also states that the 
CDSE is responsible for knowing what CDSs are listed on the NCDSMO list, and what 
capabilities the CDSs provide. The CDSE will work closely with the DoD components 
throughout the entire RMF process to ensure they are aware of the documentation and 
guidance and procedures entailed with the RMF process (DoD Chief Information Officer, 
2017a, p. 33).  
(2) CDTAB 
Under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD ISRMC and DSAWG, the 
CDTAB serves as a technical advisory board to the DSAWG and provides CDS selection 
recommendations, along with CDS security impact to the DoDIN, if applicable (DoD Chief 
Information Officer, 2017a, p. 45). 
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(3) DSAWG 
Under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD ISRMC, the DSAWG is the 
first accreditation or accreditation review level for the transport, network management, and 
network segments of the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) for the 
Department of Defense Information Networks (DoDIN) (Defense Information Systems 
Agency, 2020a, p. 1). The DSAWG makes connection approval recommendations to the 
DoD Information Security Risk Management Committee (ISRMC), and also oversees and 
provides guidance to the CDTAB (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2020a, p. 1).  
The DSAWG is composed of representatives from the following organizations: a 
DSAWG Chair (non-voting, provided by DISA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Joint Staff (JS), National Security Agency 
(NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS), Service Representatives (U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, 
U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force), DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO), U.S. 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), National Cross Domain Services Management 
Office (NCDSMO), Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), Director of 
National Intelligence Chief Information Office (DNI CIO), and Deputy Chief Management 
Office (DCMO) (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2020b, p. 1). 
(4) DoD ISRMC 
The ISRMC holds the final risk decision authority for DISN connections, and it 
may choose to delegate that responsibility to DSAWG for an enterprise CD service or CDS 
(DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017a, p. 44). It oversees the CDS approval process and 
provides guidance to the DSAWG and CDTAB. Additionally, it receives recommendations 
from the DSAWG regarding disconnection or disapproval of a CDS (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2020a, p. 1). 
(5) AO 
The AO authorizes a CDS to operate based on agreed security controls and 
acceptance of risk. The AO’s authorization is required prior to final DoD ISRMC or 
DSAWG CDS approval (DoD Chief Information Officer, 2017a, p. 50).  
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SUPPLEMENTAL.  JOINT ALL DOMAIN COMMAND AND 
CONTROL CROSS FUNCTIONAL TEAM (JADC2 CFT) 
ESTABLISHMENT 
This FOUO supplemental describes the memorandum released to govern the 
formation of the JADC2 CFT. It describes its purpose, mission, charter, involved entities, 
and organization. It also describes All Domain Operations.  
Those interested in viewing the supplementary file should contact the NPS Dudley 
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